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SATURN V SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES
SUMMARY
The Saturn V launch control and checkout system is based on demon­ 
strated advanced techniques. The system employs redundancy, repair- 
ability, rigid interface control, and a rugged and reliable central 
system to meet Saturn performance and reliability goals.
Two computer complexes placed back to back and interconnected 
through a redundant data link provide automated and remote control 
functions for the system. These computer complex systems, developed 
concurrently with the Saturn programs, provide essential functions 
but are segmented to reduce the amount of equipment that must operate 
during critical periods.
Display and control capabilities permit the operators to meet all 
normal and emergency conditions. A digital and video display system 
is capable of showing real time data concurrently with slides and closed 
loop television. Ample data processing is available to support the 
man/machine interface.
Programing methods have been developed that make the entire system 
operate in automatic and semiautomatic modes. Programs for special 
hardware testing and monitoring are generated as required.
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SATURN V SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES
The Saturn V launch control and checkout system employs hardware 
and software arranged and designed to meet stringent Saturn/Apollo 
requirements. This discussion concerns that system, its capabilities, 
and how it is meeting those requirements. The philosophies employed 
are based on the present state of the art and not on any undemonstrated 
performance of circuits or circuit elements. Care has been taken to 
thoroughly cover every reasonable need of the system. Unnecessary 
complexity in the name of "someday it may be needed" has been avoided 
to preserve the highest possible reliability. Emphasis has been placed 
on using that which will do the best job and not in doing that which is 
fashionable. For example, relay circuitry is employed in the electrical 
system where a relay does the best job. Solid state circuitry is used 
where relays are not fast enough or would have to operate too many times 
in the launch and checkout processes.
The launch control and checkout equipment for Saturn is divided 
into two main categories. One is the equipment located in the launch 
control center; the other is the equipment located in the mobile launcher, 
which interfaces directly with the vehicle and the equipment located 
permanently in the launch pad area. The vehicle is mounted on the mobile 
launcher and checked out in the vertical assembly building, where all 
mating tests and overall vehicle systems tests are performed. After the 
vehicle has been mated with the launch control equipment and all systems 
have been verified and made ready for launch, the mobile launcher is 
moved from the vertical assembly building to the launch pad, where the 
vehicle is checked out and launched. This requires that a minimum 
number of electrical and mechanical connections be made, broken, and 
made again in this overall operation.
The most critical period for the launch control system is the launch 
day, just as it is for the vehicle. Figure 1 shows the launch-day mission 
time that has been assumed in a typical Apollo launch. The day ! s activity 
is divided into two phases. Phase I is an extension of previous activity, 
in which all of the systems are verified and made ready for launch. During 
this time, last minute checks of calibrations, presettings, and other 
critical parameters are made. After Phase I, the mobile launcher is 
vacated, except for the crew in the spacecraft. Phase II begins approxi­ 
mately 4-1/2 hours before the first launch opportunity. During Phase II, 
the general vehicle system is in a ready-for-launch status. However, 
items such as propellant loading, system pressurization, power transfer, 
purging, final launch sequencing, ignition sequencing, final azimuth 
alignment, and presettings of the guidance system, and launch commit 
(holddown release) must be accomplished. Launch opportunities are ex­ 
pected to cover a launch window of 2-1/2 hours, the time during which 
the vehicle can be launched and meet all of the flight mechanical con­ 
straints posed by the lunar mission. All of the launch control equipment
611
on the mobile launcher must operate unattended for a period of approxi­ 
mately seven hours. Any equipment failures during this period of time 
will result in a "scrub" for that day, because the vehicle will have to 
be defueled before the repair crew can repair the failure. (While there 
may be some exception to this defueling requirement, it must be assumed 
for the general case.)
Because of the reliability requirements placed on the launch control 
system design, the equipment in the mobile launcher must have a .99 pro­ 
bability of success for the seven-hour period shown. In other words, the 
system is allowed one "scrub" because of mobile-launcher launch control 
equipment in 100 launch attempts. In the case of the equipment located 
in the launch control center, the requirements are such that it must have 
an availability which can be expressed as a combination of pure reliability 
and limited repairability of .995 for the entire 15-hour period shown. 
This represents one-half "scrub" per 100 launch attempts because of lack 
of launch control center availability.
Four methods in system layout and operation have been utilized in 
the Saturn V system to increase its probability of mission success. These 
are as follows:
a. Redundancy of systems and alternate mode operations
b. Repairability through crew experience and applicable spares
c. Stringent interface control that involves divisions of system 
and subsystem functions and proper interface functional design.
d. A high "flight standard" reliability basic system.
The most common form of redundancy employed in various forms through­ 
out the system is that shown in Figure 2, in which A and B represent the 
system. During Phase I, each element works on a certain portion of the 
problem so that both elements contribute toward accomplishing the task. 
During Phase II, both elements are available to do the same job; a failure 
in one element does not mean a loss of the total function. This method 
of redundancy is utilized extensively throughout the system and involves 
a minimum amount of switching to gain the benefits of the redundancy 
employed. In both phases, all units of the system are working properly 
and the effectiveness and capability of the system are doubled. Care 
has been taken to ensure that no single functional element, equivalent 
to A or B, is too large or too complex. Thus, each element is a reliable 
unit within itself. Combining two such reliable modular elements to per­ 
form a given function in a redundant manner produces a very high expected 
reliability.
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Repairability properly used represents a very significant method 
in ascertaining that equipment will be available when needed. Although 
equipment should not require repair, the probability of failure in rare 
instances does exist. If it is assumed that (a) the mean-time-to-repair 
is much smaller than the launch window requirement and (b) the launch 
window is much smaller than the particular system 1 s mean-time-to-failure, 
a simple expression for the probability, (P), that the equipment will be 
available at any instant of time can be written as follows:
P = 1 - MTR ,
MTF
where MTR = mean-time-to-repair and MTF = mean-time-to-failure for the 
system. This simple expression shows that the actual mission time (which 
in the case of the launch control center is 15 hours) is not really a 
factor, providing the repair is made quickly, the system has been designed 
to be fail-safe, and the countdown process can be adjusted to absorb a 
small delay. The mean-time-to-failure is mean-time-to-significant-failure, 
which is one that stops the countdown launch process. Here, again, redun­ 
dancy will be employed during critical phases to increase this mean-time- 
to-failure figure. The mean-time-to-repair for equipment in the launch 
control center, based on Saturn experience, has been assumed to be one- 
half hour. On this basis, the launch control center system should have 
a mean-time-between-significant-failures of at least 100 hours. The same 
experience also shows that failures of the "quality-type, 11 such as im­ 
proper soldering, broken, or shorted wiring, etc., are the most time-con­ 
suming to locate and repair. Therefore, this one-half hour repair assump­ 
tion can be made only with a system built to high quality standards.
The methods employed to increase the circuit reliability of the basic 
system will be discussed when the characteristics of that system are de­ 
scribed. These methods can be summarized by stating that methods employed, 
as well as the basic components utilized, are the same as those employed 
in the flight system.
The central launch control system controls the total operation. This 
control is accomplished directly and through control of a set of subsystems, 
each one of which is devoted to a certain task. The methods for determining 
systems and subsystems function allocations and the interface.design criteria 
will be explored when the system is covered in greater detail* Decisions 
have been made to minimize such factors as complication in design and check­ 
out, effect of engineering changes, intersystem interference, personnel 
cross-training, and even organizational stresses that exist simply because 
this is a large system which integrates technical specialties of many 
different organizations. (This results in the type of reliability which 
is difficult to assess, but which is very apparent during design, checkout, 
and overall system integration.) Each subsystem is a controllable self- 
contained segment designed to do that which special purpose hardware can
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do best, but not to duplicate the capabilities of the central launch 
control system. Through this control, subsystem requirements not vital 
to launch day activities have have not been allowed to increase the 
complexity of the central launch control system. These requirements 
have been eliminated through redesign or have been made the responsibility 
of the subsystem itself.
To describe the launch control and checkout system, its makeup, and 
capabilities, it is best to start at the center of the system. The func­ 
tions portrayed in Figure 3 denote the capabilities of the central system 
with particular emphasis on those functions performed for the total system. 
All functions are performed either in the launch control center or on the 
mobile launcher. The mobile launcher functions include those associated 
with the space vehicle and adjacent fixed installation equipment, whether 
that equipment is in the vertical assembly building or at the launching 
pad area. In this figure, the functions of the central system are noted 
along with the inputs and outputs to that system.
The two-way data link function shown is an obvious requirement since 
the mobile launcher will operate as far as seven miles from the launch 
control center. This link function will move two-way commands and data. 
It must operate efficiently and very reliably.
The decommutation function is another way of saying that the check­ 
out system and the operating personnel require a significant amount of 
the total data available in the vehicle telemetry system. The central 
system must employ methods to accept, sort out, and present to the equip­ 
ment and the operators any required information.
Event timing signifies the evaluation of the time history associated 
with any of the inputs and outputs to which the central system has access. 
For instance, the time it takes a relay chain to operate, the time it takes 
a certain voltage to reach a given level, the time of a given valve closure, 
etc., are some of the times determined by the central system.
Computational functions associated with the central system take two 
forms:
a. The normally expected amount of on-site computation needed to 
prepare the vehicle systems for launch. An example of this is the real 
time commutation of the required guidance system alignment and the result­ 
ing guidance parameters when the system is tracking a non-earth-fixed 
destination.
b. Comparing an existing condition in the system with a "should be" 
condition based on previous computed or recorded conditions.
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The recording function shown is one of storing significant real time 
data as they occur. It can then be available during the launch process 
or for post launch evaluation.
The real time monitor process is the continuous examination of key 
parameters in the system. This examination compares the system condition 
with that expected. Any deviations are reported to the operator and such 
automatic steps and corrective measures are taken by the system as may be 
required by the mission rules for that particular event.
The command interpretation and execution takes two forms:
a. Operator inputs to the system through digital commands or through 
on-off switch commands result in required actions in the mobile launcher 
area.
b. Changes in state occurring at the input to the central system 
at the mobile launcher area are treated by the system. In many instances, 
these will be commands that require action in the launch control center.
The emergency sense and control functions sense critical items in 
the hardware system on a continuous basis and take some immediate correc­ 
tive action. Redundancy switching falls under this category. This type 
sensing must also occur within the central control system as well as 
sensing of inputs to the central control system. For example, the central 
system will respond to a power loss by sensing that power loss, alerting 
the operator, storing away all pertinent data that can be called up when 
the power returns, and taking immediate steps to protect all inputs and 
outputs so that no spurious signals during the power failure will change 
the existing state of the outputs of the system. (During this type of 
failure mode, the central system is arranged to allow the launch control 
center to change the state of any of its outputs. Also, hardlines around 
the system are provided to "safe 11 the vehicle system for the crew and for 
the launch operational personnel.) When power returns, the central system 
will pick up where it left off, after assuring that the overall system is 
in a condition required by the launch personnel and by the associated 
mission rules for central system power failure.
Logical control functions are associated with detecting input changes 
of states in the system and causing another change in state to occur in 
the same area.
The priority assessment function is one of making certain that the 
most important happenings in the system receive attention first. For 
example, if the operator decides to manually control any item also being 
controlled by a test routine, the central system will honor this command 
to higher priority than the execution of that particular test program. 
This priority assessment function takes many forms. These range from
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detecting emergency conditions in the external equipment and causing 
the emergency sense and control functions to occur, to the priority 
assessments required to maintain good housekeeping in a system of this 
magnitude.
The data storage function shown is intended to denote the require­ 
ment to store a great deal of precalculated and pregenerated data so 
that the central system and operating personnel have available information 
when it is needed.
The self-checking function is necessary in a system of this magnitude. 
Full availability of the system depends on knowing the operating conditions 
of the system at all times. Any alternate modes of operation are available 
once a failure has been detected by the operators or by the system.
Further requirements placed on the central system are portrayed by 
the input-output requirements shown. The system provides conditioned 
proportional voltage outputs to drive meters and special analog recorders 
in the launch control center. In the mobile launcher complex, proportional 
voltages are also available that serve as commands and represent error 
signals etc. The discrete voltages provided by the system are 0 and 28 
volt dc signals of sufficient power to drive relays etc. This require­ 
ment exists in both the launch control center and the mobile launcher area
The central system is called on to interpret 0 to 28 volt dc changes 
as changes in system state. The central system must signal-condition 
these voltages to meet the internal logic requirements of the central 
system. This input requirement exists in both areas. Similarly,appro- 
priate signal conditioning and analog-to-digital conversion is required 
to evaluate proportional-voltage inputs to the system.
Both areas of system operations require parallel transmission of 
digital data to basically digital susbystems or devices. Bidirectional 
data are exchanged in the launch control center where, for instance, data 
are sent to and received from the spacecraft checkout equipment. The 
onboard computer system in the vehicle exchanges data with the central 
system in the mobile launcher area.
Both areas of operation require inputs from timing standards and 
synchronizing systems.
It becomes apparent as the requirements of the system are discussed 
that a function at the interface of the central system in the launch 
control center has a counterpart in the mobile launcher area. A back- 
to-back mirror image system results when like quantities are compared 
in the two areas. From the equipment development standpoint, a similar 
requirement exists. A high quality system is required on the mobile 
launcher to meet the expected performance goals, and a similar high 
quality system is required in the launch control center to meet the 
overall availability requirements placed on that system.
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The launch control system (Figure 4) shows the general solution to 
the requirements placed on the central system. Two computer complexes 
placed back to back and interconnected by a special data link (DL) are 
utilized in the central system. Having a computer at each end of the 
data link allows a process which moves only significant data and avoids 
unnecessary handling of insignificant data in real time. The digital 
data acquisition system (DBAS) is the mechanism that provides decommutated 
and conditioned data to the computer complex and to the display stations. 
(This system will be discussed in a following presentation.) A mobile 
launcher telemetry system provides significant data to the DBAS where, 
in turn, these data are available to both computer complexes and the 
operational personnel. These same data are also available to the com­ 
puter complex to provide a direct access without the effects of commuta­ 
tion that would be present if the data were to be received through the 
DDAS. This is a redundant path for critical data during Phase II opera­ 
tions. Providing DDAS data to both complexes enhances the operation of 
the overall system during Phase I and offers a redundant source of data 
during Phase II. The display station makeup provides a number of alter­ 
nate mode possibilities during temporary loss of any one of the command 
or display capabilities. The self-checking capability is enhanced by a 
computer on each side of the central system. The data link is self- 
checking in its basic operation.
A computer complex is shown in Figure 5. (Not shown are items such 
as line printer, cardreaders, paper tape punch, etc.) It is made up of 
specially-built interfacing equipment to do the tasks previously dis­ 
cussed, plus conventional computer elements. Eight individual memory 
elements are provided. Each memory element is 4,096 words. Seven 
buffer data channels move data in and out of the memory elements. Each 
of the data channels has been designed to interface the memory system 
with specific input-output areas. The data channels associated with the 
discrete input system continuously scan the input discretes and auto­ 
matically write the status of the discretes in a memory block in pre­ 
determined locations. These data channels will also alert the control 
logic portion of the machine through priority interrupt circuitry when 
they detect a change in input status. The control portion of the mach­ 
ine is then free to operate on any given problem without having to inter­ 
rogate the discrete input channels except when it is alerted. A similar 
method is employed with all data channels to allow all elements of the 
system to operate independently as possible. The data channel operation 
is totally independent of the computer cycle operations (no cycle-stealing) 
with the exception of setup and termination operations.
Information passed to the data link system is stored and reformated 
in the data link terminal for transmission to a corresponding data link 
terminal at the other computer complex. A data block transmission is 
accomplished utilizing horizontal and vertical parity checking to vir­ 
tually eliminate undetected errors in transmission. Redundant data link 
systems have been provided.
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The discrete output system is triple-modular redundant with majority 
voting on each of the output channels. Independent power supplies and 
sources are provided for each group of discrete output channels. (A 
backup mode also exists wherein the data link can drive the discrete out­ 
put system directly in case of failure in the normal system.) This con­ 
figuration avoids changes in the output commands during any emergencies 
that may involve the computer portions of the system. If the computer 
cannot drive the discrete output system, control of the discrete system 
is available directly from the data link until the computer is brought 
back to normal operating conditions.
The interface with the DBAS is accomplished through a memory element 
in that system so that any given parameter data can be assessed immediately 
by the computer without having to wait for the normal decommutation pro­ 
cess. Through this interfacing method, the computer has random access to 
all DBAS data. This memory element is identical to the memory elements 
in the computer.
Two tape station systems are available through separate data channels 
and operate in a redundant fashion where required.
Added storage of 32,000 words in each complex is provided by the drum 
system shown.
In the launch control center, a data channel is utilized to interface 
with the digital display and control subsystem.
Three timers determine time intervals and control the various system 
processes. These timers also work through the interrupt system of the 
computer.
The interface modules are special registers designed to interface 
the computer directly with the functions shown.
Note that as the launch process advances from Phase I to Phase II, 
more and more of the computer complex on the mobile launcher can be 
eliminated from the active system because of the way the complex has 
been segmented. It is possible during Phase II to reduce the amount of 
electronics in the critical path to no more than that which would have 
been required to assemble data for a "data link only 11 system. Redundant 
access to practically all critical data is possible either within one 
complex or within a combination of the complexes and the DBAS. Obviously, 
the computer complex power supplies,a portion of the control logic, a 
minimum number of memories, and the data link data channel must be in 
operation to get full usage of the computer complex. Although this re­ 
presents a small portion of the total electronics involved in the system, 
it does point out the need for a basically reliable system. (Further 
study of alternate modes of operation is being accomplished to circumvent 
effects of failures in these modules.)
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The steps taken to maintain high reliability in the central system 
are as follows:
a. Only NASA-specification high-reliability components have been 
used in the manufacture of this system. This minimizes the effect of 
discrete component failures.
b. Serial logic design has been used wherever possible, thus re­ 
ducing critical part count.
c. No logic frequencies above one MHz have been employed in the 
central system. This allows the full application of vehicle specifica­ 
tions in the areas of soldering, wiring, conformal coating, radio fre­ 
quency interference, etc., without impact on circuit rise-time tolerances, 
power levels, and other circuit design reliability considerations. This 
application of flight standards to the system gives added confidence in 
the computer's survival during short periods of acoustical vibration, 
lack of humidity control during mobile launcher movement, etc. In the 
launch control center, this approach greatly reduces the "quality-type" 
failures previously discussed.
d. The computer complexes and their interfaces utilize "operation- 
by-exception11 and priority interrupt to reduce required system bandwidth 
requirements and increase noise immunity. Transmissions up and down the 
data link are of the summary and abbreviated nature significant to the 
computer complexes on each end of the transmission but are themselves highly 
efficient.
e. Worst-case design to military standards or better has been 
employed throughout the system.
f. All building blocks of the computer complex and the DBAS have 
been employed throughout the Saturn I, IB, and V programs. As a result, 
performance histories of all of the modules have led to a system of well- 
proven building blocks. Mean-time-between-failure and mean-time-to-repair 
figures for these modules have been generated through experience and not 
just extrapolation. Elements used in computer and other logic circuits 
have considerably varying histories when they are made integral parts of 
large systems with thousands of interfaces to power-level circuitry. 
Normal operation of the system requires frequent energizing and de-ener­ 
gizing operations, which, in turn, affects circuit performance. The 
R&D environment on early flights, both in equipment and personnel, alters 
expected overall performance. Experience gained on computer systems and 
other circuits that are functionally and electrically isolated is not 
directly applicable to launch control systems.
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The general characteristics of the computer complex and data link 
are given in Figure 7.
The launch control system shown in Figure 6 is an expanded view 
that introduces the interface concept employed throughout the system 
and shows the role of the electrical support equipment. The computer 
complex operates most of the system directly, but some subsystem break­ 
out has been necessary. Typical subsystems have been added to Figure 6 
to demonstrate the interfacing and system-subsystem functional separation. 
The electrical support equipment (which will be discussed in a later pre­ 
sentation) integrates the entire launch control system, the vehicle, and 
the fixed facility equipment at the vertical assembly building and pad 
area. The electrical support equipment also provides power, special 
sequencing functions, timing, and the display stations. The display 
stations are shown broken in two major elements, the manual monitor and 
control portion and the digital display and control subsystem.
The cross-hatched areas are interfaces that have been chosen to 
reflect the interfacing criteria mentioned previously. The data link 
system contains storage and independent transmission operation. The 
computer complex loads the data link system; the data link transmits 
the data. If it has not successfully transmitted the data after three 
attempts, it alerts the computer, whereupon the computer can try again 
or request a switch to the alternate data link system. The computer does 
not involve itself with the internal operations of the data link subsystem.
In a similar fashion, the azimuth alignment system is operated by 
inserting an azimuth to be achieved. The azimuth alignment subsystem 
then drives the vehicle stabilized platform through an optical closed loop 
system to the desired alignment. The computer monitors the fact that this 
has been accomplished but does not involve itself in the closed loop oper­ 
ation internal to the azimuth system. Any change in azimuth after that 
process causes computer interrupt, and the computer will move back to 
service the azimuth system. (Similar interfacing arrangements are utilized 
with the other subsystems.) A slightly different approach is utilized in 
propellant loading. Operations are handled in the same system-subsystem 
arrangements, except that the data set into the propellant loading system 
are transferred to the operator by the computer complex. He, in turn, 
adjusts the propellant loading settings. Again, the computer monitors 
the operation and alerts the operator of any discrepancy.
The manual monitor and control portion of the display stations 
interfaces simply and directly with special circuitry in the central 
system. This manual capability is provided to override the normal auto­ 
matic operations, where necessary, to give the operators manual control 
of the system during emergencies and to provide flexibility to the 
operators in locating and verifying failures in the overall system.
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Because of these necessary capabilities, the manual displays portray 
much of the critical data handled by the digital display and control 
system and are, therefore, a lower level backup to that system. In the 
case of the digital display and control system, the previously mentioned 
criteria of not unnecessarily complicating the vital-function-performing 
hardware or software come into play. The man/machine interface and the 
need to drive twenty display stations independently,suggested the need 
for a separate display system data processor. A small data processor, 
especially chosen to do this -job, has been added to the display system. 
The addition of this processor to the display system has not endangered 
any of the functions shown in Figure 3 because it is not in the central 
system; the overall system will not be uncontrollable if the display 
processor becomes inoperative. However, the data processing associated 
with data formating, engineering unit conversion, linearizing, etc., as 
well as subsystem management is in the digital display system to provide 
total display capability. The processor reduced the hardware in the 
display system compared to a system made up of special purpose hardware 
only. Competitive system designs were studied, wherein a single data 
processor replaced the launch-control-center computer-complex processor 
and the display data processor with equal capability. The result neces­ 
sarily violated almost all of the previously stated ground rules and 
resulted in greater, not smaller, parts count. This is because the two 
machines in the system are configured to do their specific task. The 
single machine approach greatly reduced the reliability of performing 
functions in Figure 3.
Taking the single machine approach, but using two machines in a 
redundant fashion, did not offer a worthwhile gain in reliability 
because of the switching involved with the many interfaces to the con­ 
trol system processor and the high part count in each of the single 
machines.
The third approach involved an internal-modular redundant machine, 
such as that used onboard the Saturn vehicle; but its functional cap­ 
ability could not match that of the present two-machine approach.
All of the approaches considered introduced added complexity in 
programing and hardware over the present solution.
The digital display and control system is shown in Figure 8. 
Characteristics of the processor are shown in Figure 9.
As the result of a request by the operator or a program operating 
in the central system, the processor receives basic data from the cen­ 
tral system. These data are then adiusted, formated, and passed to the 
correct refresh memory, where they are switched to the correct console 
alpha-numeric and vector display generator system and displayed on the 
cathode-ray tube.
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The video system can show selected slides or closed circuit tele­ 
vision from any one of ten inputs on any selected console.
Overlay capabilities exist between these two sources of data and 
information. A full array of controls is available to the operator at 
each console. Each console can request and read the refresh memory 
driving any other console. Likewise, any console can request and receive 
any data so that the loss of console system will only require an operator 
to share an adjoining system.
A hard copy system is available along with a television output of 
any selected data.
Each console is outfitted with a keyboard and light pen controls 
for controlling the display system and the communications with the 
central system.
Programing efforts with the launch control system have been directed 
toward the total system operation as previously described. Programing 
tasks associated with a vehicle system that has yet to be launched are 
made difficult, because much of the programing is in series with final 
design release. This has required an approach in which programing of 
a universal application is performed as much as possible. Then, as 
special programing oriented toward unique tasks becomes available, it 
is added to the basic general usage programs to complete the package.
Two types of programs are in use in the central system when the 
overall system is in the launch control and checkout process. These are 
the operating system programs and test programs. The operating system 
programs make the central system operate as a single unit and service all 
parts of the system. Complementary parts of the operating system programs 
exist in both machines. In general, these programs can be considered to 
be in seven components. These are as follows:
a. Input/output control system
b. Data link executive
c. Interrupt processor
d. Test program control
e. Display executive
f. Monitors
g. Discrete executive
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An added capability exists in the operating system program which is the 
automatic test or launch language (ATOLL) executive. ATOLL is a special 
sequence language used by the test engineer to communicate directly with 
the computer and not through a programer to perform routine sequential 
testing.
The operating system programs provide the following system capabi­ 
lities:
a. Total operator control with semiautomatic operation
b. Automatic monitor of parameters
c. Automatic display of parameters
d. Event timing and recording of events
e. Initiation of automated test
f. Generation and utilization of automated sequence procedures - 
ATOLL
The programs in the operating systems are written to utilize the 
redundant capabilities of the hardware system and, in most cases, to 
recognize the presence of a failure that requires the use of this 
capability.
Special test programs are written to cover testing of the onboard 
digital computer, stabilized platform system, networks systems, emergency 
detection systems, measuring systems, flight control systems, etc. These 
programs are called into operation by the operating systems program and 
are interwoven with the other functions of the system.
There are approximately 100,000 instructions in the operating systems 
program and the test programs planned for Saturn V.
Support programs, such as assemblers, compilers and diagnostic rou­ 
tines, are also required for the Saturn V system.
All programs, systems, and their combinations are verified in the 
Marshall Space Flight Center ! s System Development Facility.
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ASSUMED LAUNCH DAY MISSION TIMES (HOURS)
LAUNCH CONTROL CENTER ML AND PAD AREA
LCC OPERATIONS
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Computer Complex Processor
Seven special I/O buffer channels (non cycle-stealing)
Eight 24 bit I/O buffer registers - 192 I/O bits
192 sense lines
192 control lines (output)
Eight priority interrupt lines
Memory - 32,768 words - core
32,768 words - drum
6 microsecond access 
Clock frequency - 936 kHz
co Word length - 24 bits plus parity 
CD
Six index registers - card reader and punch, line printer, paper punch, and reader
Data Link
Transmission - 250 kilobits/second 
Effective data rate - 133 kilobits/second 
Command words - full duplex 
Data words - half duplex
Two-dimensional parity check
-14 
Error rate - 2,8 x 10 wore
Modulation - modified diphase
ds/word (undetected)
FIGURE 7
0) 
CO
o
HARD 
COPY
T-V TRANSMIT T-V 
VIDEO TRANSMIT
SLIDE
[ "fr
•^
-*- 
^t-
CLOSED CIRCUIT V|DEOSWITCH
(1 - 10)
^^^^^ 
CENTRAL COMPUTER
BUFFER! f ———
DISPLAY DATA REF
PROCESSOR MEM
1
——— DISTRIBUTOR
CONTROL CONTROL DIGITAL SWI
• ———— ^  ———— ——
t
A/N a
VECTOR 
DISPLAY
——— T-V
CIRCUITS
~~^ ^ ^
1 " 1 '
< TO 5 
V TWENTY J 
J DISPLAY 5 
< CONSOLES -C
•RESH CONSOLE 
DRIES INTERRUPT
KEMJs
LIGHT PENS
TCH
t
A/N a
VECTOR 
DISPLAY
T-V
CIRCUITS "*
KEYBOARD
LIGHT PEN
KEYBOARD
LIGHT PEN
DIGITAL DISPLAY 8 CONTROL SYSTEM
FIGURE 8
SYSTEM COMPONENT CHARACTERISTICS
Display Processor 
Word length 
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